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The EC DELVE Support Action (www.delve.vub.ac.be) [1] has analyzed the bottlenecks in the
transfer of Humanitarian Demining (HD) technology from technology development to the use in the
field, basing itself on the assessment of the European HD Research and Technology Development
(RTD) situation from early 1990 until 2006. The developments in HD during the last 10 years
underline the fact that in a number of cases demining related developments have been terminated
or at least put on hold. A number of lessons learned were drawn, bottlenecks identified and broadly
classified as either Confidence, Cost, or Communication related. The study also showed that the
funding provided by the European Commission (EC) has led directly to the creation of an extensive
portfolio of HD technology development projects. However, the range of instruments available to the
EC to finance the necessary R&D was limited to pre-competitive research. The EC had no tools or
programs to fund actual product development. The corresponding consequences are detailed in the
study. The separation of the Mine Action and RTD funding streams in the EC did also negatively
affect the take-up of new technologies. As a main conclusion, creating coherence between: (1) the
EC policy based on political decisions, (2) RTD, testing and industrialization of equipment, and
(3) timely deployment, requires a new way of coordinated thinking: “end-to-end planning” has to
be supported by a well organized and coordinated organizational structure involving different DGs
(Directorate General) and even extending beyond the EU. This was not the case for Mine Action.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The EC DELVE Support Action has analyzed the bot-
tlenecks in the transfer of Humanitarian Demining (HD)
technology from technology development to the use in
the field, and drawn some lessons learned, basing itself on
the assessment of the European Humanitarian Demining
RTD (Research and Technology Development) situation
from early 1990 until 2006. The situation at European
level was analyzed with emphasis on activities sponsored
by the EC (European Commission). Moreover, four Eu-
ropean countries (B, D, NL and UK) were selected, to-
gether with Japan, with emphasis on national activities.
The original project objectives have been defined un-
der the assumption that DELVE would be a project in
parallel to a number of projects for the development of
Humanitarian Demining technology under the 2004 call
in the Information Society Technologies (IST) program,
within the 6th EU Framework Program for Research and
Technological Development (FP6) [2]. The overall goal
was to generate synergy between these projects and na-
tional programs in the various countries in Europe. The
unexpected outcome of the evaluation of the proposals
for this call, was that there would be no projects in FP6
specifically aiming at technology for Humanitarian Dem-
ining. From the assessment of the European R&D sit-
uation conducted during the first year of the DELVE
project, it also became clear that the national research
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activities on technology for Humanitarian Demining were
strongly decreasing in size. For these reasons the oppor-
tunities for synergy as anticipated in the original DELVE
work plan did no longer exist and the original goals could
only be pursued to a very limited extent. From the new
perspective the focus shifted towards the modified objec-
tives detailed in Section IIC.
II. WORK PERFORMED
A. Approach used
The study team have taken a number of approaches
in assessing the analysis of the Humanitarian Demining
R&D situation. The team started from the existing body
of literature and contacts accumulated from the extensive
participation to European and national R&D programs
in the past decade [3], complemented where necessary
with targeted literature surveys (documents, databases,
and internet search). A number of direct contacts and
where appropriate specific interviews were used for the
selected countries, both to compile the detailed descrip-
tions of the most important national activities and to
complement our analysis. Representative events, organi-
zations and projects were selected rather than seeking to
be exhaustive.
2FIG. 1: United Kingdom RTD Activities Timeline
3B. First phase
In the first phase of the project we identified the ma-
jor stakeholders in Humanitarian Demining RTD. This
allowed us to analyze country per country the actual
R&D situation. Starting from the results of the EU-
DEM2 project [3] we reviewed the overview of the general
Organizational aspects in some selected European coun-
tries as well as at the European Union (EU) level. This
analysis led to the unexpected result that many of the
R&D programs have ended in the period 2003–2005. The
original project goal of generating synergy was therefore
no longer achievable.
C. Second phase
The second phase of the project focused on a set of
modified objectives. This paper will deal in particular
with the results related to objectives 2 and 3 (see below),
since the analysis of the decline of R&D project funding
and the corresponding lessons learned are considered to
be of interest for a broader audience outside Europe.
– Objective 2) Detailed summary of the ending of the
R&D project funding in Europe and a thorough
analysis of the reasons why this has happened.
During the study a large set of data was collected on
HD R&D projects in Europe both on EC level and
on a national level for the selected countries (Bel-
gium, Germany, Netherlands and the United King-
dom). The results of these HD R&D projects were
also analyzed. Furthermore, a number of R&D
projects and project clusters were selected for more
detailed analysis. Data on HD R&D in Japan was
collected for comparison. This objective resulted
in DELVE Report T4.1-D4.1 “Humanitarian Dem-
ining R&D project funding in Europe” [4].
– Objective 3) Analysis of the lessons learned which
seeks to apply the results of the analysis prospec-
tively to future R&D projects in the broad field of
ICT for risk/crisis management, and provide useful
support in defining the ToR (Terms of Reference)
for Risk and Crisis management for FP7.
Based on the case studies on European R&D (in-
cluding discussions with researchers and program
and project managers, and including information
from representatives from NGOs and Mine Action
Centers) a number of lessons learned have been de-
fined in support of future programs. These lessons
learned cover the area of R&D for Humanitarian
Demining in general. Some lessons learned are less
specific to Humanitarian Demining but are more
related to the structuring of R&D projects in the
EC framework programs. This objective resulted
in DELVE Report T4.2-D4.2 “Humanitarian Dem-
ining R&D - Lessons learned” [5].
III. ACHIEVED RESULTS
A. Collection of data
During the study we did collect an enormous amount
of data which has been organized in a database and made
available for access via the DELVE website [1]. The
data were collected among others through participation
at conferences, participation in meetings of Humanitar-
ian Demining co-ordination groups (ITEP, GICHD), as
well as during actual participation in field test in Asia,
Africa and South Eastern Europe. Moreover we did an-
alyze historical data. Pulling together major events and
research projects in one timeline illustrates the evolution
over time and the relation between events and R&D.
An example is given in Fig. 1 for the situation in the
UK: the top half contains in particular important po-
litical events, decisions and conferences, as well as key
dates in the development of the commercial ERA GPR
systems (relevant to the gap to market case study, Sec-
tion VI). The bottom half contains in the centre indica-
tions on R&D projects, in particular those which eventu-
ally led to the MINEHOUND system (again of relevance
for the gap to market case study), the DFID procurement
call of 1999, indications on some military projects (from
the early Falkland Islands work to MCMC and DCMC),
and data collection and field trials (bottom, mainly the
PHMD and MINETECT/ MINEHOUND dual sensor
systems).
To support our findings, we have carried out a bib-
liometric study in order to analyze how the key R&D
topics related to demining research evolved during the
past 10 year, using as reference the yearly SPIE confer-
ence on “Detection and Remediation of Mines and Mine-
like Targets”. It is acknowledged that this conference is
largely US oriented, heavily influenced by defense spon-
sored work, and partially suffering from a lack of end-user
input. However, this event was the only one which ran
(and still runs) yearly since 1995 consistently, greatly fa-
cilitating comparisons and the analysis of trends, with
most results being applicable as well to demining R&D
in Europe. Figure 2 provides an idea of the evolution
of the total number of published papers (conference pro-
ceedings) over time, where one can notice the decline of
the R&D activities on landmine detection and remedi-
ation starting in the year 2004. The number of papers
in the program for 2008 is 57. Note that reporting at
conferences usually has some delay after the finalization
of the corresponding research activities. This means that
the actual decay in HD R&D may have started some time
before the decay in the number of publications.
Concerning the key R&D topics themselves, when plot-
ting the number of papers subdivided by subject category
(radar, IR, Trace, Bulk, etc.) and looking at the evolu-
tion of the single categories over time (see Ref. [4] for
details), one can conclude that:
– There has always been an important data process-
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ing, sensor fusion and radar component (the three
together accounting in certain years for nearly half
of all the publications);
– The interest in soil/environmental studies was
small at the beginning and has clearly increased
over the years;
– The amount of radar oriented publications de-
creased over the years;
– Infrared based detection showed several peaks over
the years and then regressed strongly;
– Bulk detection is small compared to Trace detec-
tion throughout, with the latter becoming more im-
portant lately.
B. Identification of key stakeholders
Based on the material available the main stakehold-
ers around Humanitarian Demining research have been
identified. Figure 3 illustrates how we structured the key
stakeholders and the interactions between them. In gen-
eral this structure can be found at the European level but
also at a national level with some minor modifications.
This political arena is probably the most difficult to
deal with. Each stakeholder has his own individual mo-
tivations and driving factors. Progress in Humanitarian
Demining is a common driver for all stakeholders, but
certainly not the only one and sometimes not the most
important one. For example when the ministry of edu-
cation in a country sponsors a research project on Hu-
manitarian Demining technology at a university, the core
business for the ministry is still education and not Hu-
manitarian Demining.
From the observation that there is not a single and
uniform motivation shared between the stakeholders it is
easy to understand that an overall coherent strategy, in-
tegrating RTD actors, mine action donors and field prac-
titioners (deminers) [6], was never implemented. (This
integration has been partly implemented in the case of
already developed promising technologies, which still re-
quire extensive field testing, e.g., via ITEP.). The lack of
such an overall and coherent strategy has probably been
the single most important bottleneck in Humanitarian
Demining related R&D.
FIG. 3: Key Players Structure.
This resulted at European level – apart from
the large EC sponsored effort – in each coun-
try basically following a different approach to-
wards Humanitarian Demining R&D (frag-
mentation of European research scenario).
It also resulted in some research topics be-
ing quite well covered, such as GPR or multi-
sensor data fusion, while others, such as R&D
on mechanical equipment or on trace explo-
sive detection, which appeared to be an area
with potential for a breakthrough technology,
being neglected.
In this political arena, full coherence would
admittedly have been very difficult to imple-
ment in practice, and incoherence was partly
unavoidable due to the very nature of R&D,
the large number of stakeholders involved,
and conflicting interests. However, under-
standing the motivations, driving factors and
interactions in this arena will help decision
makers in at least trying to avoid conflicting
decisions. Eventually this should contribute
to decreasing the effects of the bottlenecks
for technology introduction which will be dis-
cussed in the following.
Still concerning the key stakeholders and their inter-
actions, it would also have helped, in particular at Eu-
ropean level, if new funding structures for Prototyp-
ing/T&E/ Production had been implemented. Such a
process needs the key decision makers to be “on-board”
and well informed, as well as the capability of convinc-
ing everybody that significant investments, a long term
vision and the will to “carry through” are needed to get
substantial rewards down the line.
Finally, Industrial/End Users partnership in particular
has often been acknowledged to be essential to speed-
up the integration of new developments into demining
operations (“risk management” on both sides) [7].
5C. HD vs. Military R&D Relationship
Due to the nature of the landmine problem, military
approaches and R&D activities can obviously not be ig-
nored even if the target scenario is strictly humanitar-
ian. We will focus here on the effects of military R&D
on the development of demining technology of interest
to Humanitarian Demining (“spin-in” to HD). A more
extensive discussion is reported in Ref. [4].
Based on the work performed for military countermine
equipment, in the mid-90s there was widespread opti-
mism that a breakthrough could be achieved in demi-
ning technology. For example, the general opinion was
that the detection performance could be significantly im-
proved by combining different detection techniques, while
at the same time reducing the false alarm rate. Several
nations started large research programs to develop this
type of technology.
Around the year 2000 it became clear that these
techniques, which might show success for the detection
of large anti-tank mines, were less suitable for anti-
personnel mines. This disappointment was in part due
to fundamental physical limitations which blocked tech-
nological progress. May be even more important was the
misperception of the main problems in demining oper-
ations, due to the lack of communication with the end
users. For example, taking the military user as a start-
ing point, one assumes well trained users, good logistics
support, significant budgets, etc. These conditions are
clearly different in Humanitarian Demining.
The research into landmine detection techniques did
not completely stop at that point. More incremental im-
provements were instead pursued. The perception of the
actual end users needs did also improve. This resulted for
example in the development of hand-held mine detectors
which combine metal detection and ground penetrating
radar. In this case the perspective of military use (and
sales) of these systems justified the funding.
Development for Humanitarian Demining only would
not provide a solid business case, because the expected
market is too small for an acceptable return on invest-
ment. This was well illustrated by a case study by Newn-
ham and Daniels [8], where the authors argued that the
cost of a relatively simple improvement of a metal detec-
tor could not be covered by the total market for Human-
itarian Demining, because the sales numbers are so small
that this would lead to unacceptable price increases.
D. Identification of bottlenecks in technology
transfer
The bottlenecks in the transfer of technology from
technology development to the use in the field were cat-
egorized as either (i) Confidence, (ii) Cost, or (iii) Com-
munication related (see Fig. 4).
FIG. 4: “Confidence-Cost-Communication” Gap-to-market
Model.
IV. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
BOTTLENECKS AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES
Two of the main products of DELVE: (i) the collection
of the lessons learned, and (ii) the analysis of the situ-
ation for Environmental Risk Management, have been
prepared in terms of the analysis of the bottlenecks of
the Humanitarian Demining RTD activities over the past
years. The main outcome is summarized in the sections
below, including possible remedies. The analysis of suc-
cess factors in a number of case studies of technology de-
velopment projects contributed to the definition of these
potential remedies.
A. Confidence related issues
Building end-user confidence in technology
Confidence in new technology has to be built up. Tech-
nology demonstrated only in controlled test environments
is not very convincing, although tests under such condi-
tions are necessary and can be part of the confidence
building process.
Confidence is however not always based on scientifi-
cally proven data. During the EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 con-
ference [9] first results were presented on rigorous testing
of well accepted HD techniques – metal detectors and
prodders – which showed much less than 100% detection
rates. New technologies with similar non-perfect test re-
sults will not be accepted for field use, and perhaps not
even fully tried out in practice, which illustrates that
confidence is essential for the end user.
Possible remedy: Rather than trying to replace tech-
nology currently in use one should try to operate in par-
allel and show the benefits of the new technology to the
user. This is for example done by several developers
of hand-held multi-sensor systems (MINEHOUND and
HSTAMIDS).
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Cost of product development/Lack of financial continuity
Many of the projects aimed at the development of dem-
ining technology resulted in a demonstration of a proof of
concept or a demonstration system (some did not even
reach this level). Further product development, which
is well-known to often cost much more than the initial
demonstration or proof of concept stage, was hardly ever
sponsored.
This finance gap (“death valley”) between R&D and
field-ready technologies has been well-known over the
years, and was already specifically discussed at EC level
in 1997, and possibly even earlier. However, due to the
EC R&D funding constraints (pre-competitive R&D only
as a consequence of the laws on competition – support
cannot be given to turn a working prototype into a com-
mercial production item), it was in practice impossible
to overcome this at EC level.
Possible remedies: In retrospective it might have
helped to find ways to select a few systems and carry
them through the full development cycle, similarly to
what is done in certain military procurement processes.
The concept of a supra-national Equipment Procurement
Agency, acquiring, organizing and maintaining a central
pool of equipment (technical toolbox), which could be
called upon by the deminers following e.g., a leasing for-
mula, was also discussed as the basis of a solution to
meet the market requirements. This type of agency did
however never see the light.
Absence of a commercial market
It has become clear in the past years that the mar-
ket for Humanitarian Demining sensing technologies and
systems is nowhere as large as initially assumed. This
is coupled to “the uncertainty of the prospective sales
volume” [8] (which can depend heavily on unpredictable
political priorities) and to “the extensive and expensive
trials required to prove the performance achieved and
the very real risk that these trials will fail to confirm the
original expectations of the user (deminer) community”.
Possible remedies: Some possible strategies have al-
ready been presented in the previous section. “Spin-offs”
from HD to other markets (i.e., search for non-demining
applications for the technologies being developed) were
also considered. The most important ones seem nowa-
days to be security and military demining.
Level of cost trade-off
The level at which financial decisions are made is of
key importance. At local level the decisions will be dif-
ferent than at national or even international level. For
example, contracts for demining operations tend to be
too small, and possibly non-renewable, to justify signif-
icant investment in technical equipment by a demining
organization.
Possible remedies: One possible strategy consists in
combining budgets at a sufficiently high level (interna-
tional) to allow the development and fielding of technol-
ogy. The trade-off should then be made between the cost
of the technology and the savings made in operations due
to higher demining productivity. In other words, the cost
of research on demining in technology should be com-
pared to the potential cost reduction of the use of this
technology worldwide. Donors for technology research
and donors for actual demining are usually not the same;
this cost-benefit analysis is therefore hardly ever made.
At end user level, larger demining projects should be
supported or, if not possible, other methods devised to
ensure continuity of operations, in order to enable long
term investment in technology.
C. Communication related issues
Basic understanding of the problem and clear problem
overview
It might seem obvious that a problem has to be well
described and understood before it can be tackled, but
this was not the case at the beginning for Humanitar-
ian Demining. Reasons are the lack of communication
between the end users and the technology developers,
the fact that the demining one is still a relatively young
industry, and the initial difficulty of the demining com-
munity in coming up with clear scenario definitions.
Parameters such as equipment robustness, ease of use,
acceptable system cost and operating costs, and operator
training level, have not always been considered in the
R&D projects from the very beginning.
Possible remedy: To increase the understanding of the
requirements it is sometimes very useful to have a set of
scenarios. These scenarios should be defined with strong
input from demining organizations and also agreed by
them. The scenarios should provide a description of the
operational concept of the application of the technique
or technology by the user. Based on the scenarios and
operational concept description the actual requirements
can be derived taking into account both the problems and
the boundary conditions imposed by the use in the field
and the technical limitations for the specific technological
solution. It is therefore obvious that the definition of
technical requirements requires adequate communication
between end-users and technology developers.
Exchange on technical topics at the right level between
researchers and deminers
A critical factor in the process of defining the prod-
uct goal in a technology development process is that the
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organization is able to understand the potential of the
technique and that at the same time the researcher can
understand the operational requirements.
Possible remedy: Visits to demining operations and
discussions with technical representatives from Human-
itarian Demining organizations during conferences like
EUDEM2-SCOT [9], or field visits, or courses reserved
for scientists and technicians will facilitate this process.
Communication to stakeholders
Competing projects: The presence of similar projects
is part of a natural process in R&D, at least during the
initial development stages, but can be difficult to explain
to the end users and the general public in high visibility
domains such as Humanitarian Demining, and therefore
be subject to public pressure and criticism.
Basic research versus Product development: It is a fact
that the lead times of some R&D sensing technologies
can be very long (GPR, trace explosive detection, smart
metal detector). It might be tempting to announce tech-
nical breakthroughs, but this should be done with great
care. Overexposure of immature technology and unreal-
istic claims and promises for future effectiveness based on
initial experiments have done a lot of harm in the com-
munication between the research community and the end
users.
Possible remedy: The maturity of the development
should always be clearly stated. A common method for
indicating the maturity of technology is the Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) scale [10].
Communication between R&D projects (past and present)
Competing projects: It is acknowledged that increas-
ing the communication between competing projects is
difficult, and not only when there are clear commercial
interests. Ways should nevertheless be found to make
a project’s results more visible. Lack of communication
between projects in high visibility domains such as Hu-
manitarian Demining can be difficult to understand for
the end users and the general public.
Possible remedy: Mandatory publishing of short sum-
maries (and possibly of the main results), or well struc-
tured and content-rich websites. Encourage participa-
tion and organization at selected events, e.g., “cluster”
meetings, or networking opportunities such as the Nordic
Demining Research Forum. Ideally there should also be
a clear and effective knowledge transfer between a start-
ing project and those in the same domain having already
completed.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
In addition to the lessons learned related to the specific
bottlenecks analyzed so far, some more general lessons
learned have also been extracted, as listed below. Al-
though they are written as an advice to the EC, they
have a more general validity.
A. Cost
Realistic assessment of all costs
Development and trials costs, risks, timescales and re-
turn on investment are not always taken into analysis
by consortia bidding for EC co-funded R&D projects.
It was suggested (Ref. [5] and references therein) that
any consortium should “present a proper justification of
their proposal”, including a realistic assessment of the
previously mentioned factors, before receiving EC sup-
port. “These justifications should then be evaluated by
relevant experts in much more depth than current prac-
tice allows. As the result of such evaluation there will
often be the need for the proposal to be revised – and
the current practices need to be amended to permit such
iteration.”
Relative benefits of new technology
Assessing the real benefits of a new technology should
be done by means of appropriate tools, such as cost-
effectiveness analysis. Such an assessment would in-
volve an evaluation on how Humanitarian Demining con-
tributes to higher economic or political goals in terms of
(growth of) economic activities or political stability in a
region. Expressing the results of this evaluation in finan-
cial terms would then help to judge the justification of
investment on demining technology.
B. Test & Evaluation
Test and Evaluation is discusses in detail in Ref. [5].
Here we will only emphasize that testing requires signif-
icant engineering competence and advance planning; it
should not be considered as something to be done quickly
towards the end of a project. There is a need to test
the fundamental principles of new technologies as well
as their implementation and suitability to form part of
a Humanitarian Demining system for use in the field.
Particular attention needs also to be paid to the careful
design of realistic and meaningful assessment of equip-
ment, especially when it uses new principles. Finally, the
independence of testing must be guaranteed when the
end-user is a member of the project consortium.
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played an important role in supporting Test and Evalua-
tion activities. Over the lifetime of ITEP since the year
2000 many common projects have been successfully com-
pleted. The corresponding results (and reports) are pub-
lished on the website (www.itep.ws). Although not all
the projects have been reported in the same level of de-
tail, the ITEP website contains a large set of good quality
test reports. Notable ITEP results include Standardiza-
tion activities (e.g., of the evaluation of Metal Detectors),
mechanical demining tests, and the evaluation of hand
held GPR-MD sensors.
C. Contributions at European Level - Direct
results and Spin-offs to other domains
The full analysis of the situation at the European level
as a whole, with particular attention to the EC sponsored
projects, is reported in Ref. [5]. In fairness to the efforts
made during the last 10 years we summarize in Table I a
few examples of the main “spin-offs” which have resulted
from the EC co-funded projects. The most important
ones seem to be in security, military demining and
environmental risk management.
VI. GAP TO MARKET - SUCCESS CASE
STUDIES
Notwithstanding the previously illustrated bottle-
necks, in some cases it has indeed been possible to bridge,
at least partially, the gap to market, bringing new or im-
proved technology all the way to the end users. Four
selected case studies were analyzed in order to identify
the enabling factors and the circumstances which actu-
ally made this happen [4]. We will here illustrate just one
case, the UK – MINEHOUND dual sensor system.
A. Description
The MINEHOUND dual sensor detector combines
ground penetrating radar (GPR) and a pulsed metal de-
tector to reduce the false alarm rate normally encoun-
tered by metal detectors. This is expected to result in
improved productivity of mine clearing operations. The
output to the operator from both the metal detector and
GPR is by means of audio signals.
MINEHOUND is based on a custom-designed GPR
from ERA Technology Ltd (UK) and on the pulse induc-
tion MD-Type VMH3 from Vallon GmbH (Germany); it
is now in production and available from Vallon (MINE-
HOUND VMR2). The original development (called
MINETECT) was developed under the sponsorship of the
UK Department for International Development (DFID)
and MINEHOUND was additionally supported by the
German Foreign Ministry [11].
According to the manufacturer, trials in live minefields
show that the FAR can be reduced by a factor of between
two and seven times with respect to a standalone MD,
and the GPR also detects zero or minimum metal mines
that are difficult for the MD. Full details are reported for
example in Ref. [11], and references contained therein.
A number of trials have been completed over the years,
including field trials in real minefields in collaboration
with several NGOs, alongside the currently used MD and
under ITEP invigilation [12].
B. Success factors
– A number of funding sources have been exploited
over the years (including related GPR develop-
ments), both civil and military (European Commis-
sion within the DREAM and INFIELD projects for
ERA and the HOPE project for Vallon, DFID, UK
MoD, the German Foreign Ministry, etc.).
– Constant focus and dedication (continuity).
– Early GPR experience (both as ERA in the Falk-
land Islands project, 1984-1986, and separately on
commercial applications).
– ERA kept visible and continued to communicate
and disseminate information throughout.
– Operational experience with GPR products (par-
allel commercial developments and application
line[15], e.g., for civil engineering applications – see
also the UK timeline).
– Clear vision of end user requirements and accep-
tance and potential market (maybe not from the
beginning but earlier than others).
– Abandoned an imaging-based approach, targeting
the development of a “simple” acoustic interface.
– Commercial awareness (internal ERA investments)
and focus on delivering a commercial product.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, this project has analyzed the evolution of
research and development efforts in the field of technol-
ogy for Humanitarian Demining in Europe both at the
EC level and at national levels. Based on this analysis
a number of bottlenecks for the transfer of technology
from the research to the end user were identified and
potential remedies were suggested. Lessons learned and
recommendations were established for the benefit of sim-
ilar future research programs, primarily as an advice to
the EC but with a wider application range.
A. Detailed findings
What emerged from the HD R&D analysis is that:
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R&D, support activity Project (example) Direct results Spin-offs
Airborne surveys DG DEV Airborne Mine-
field Detection Pilot
Project, ARC, SMART
Demonstrator systems, flight
campaigns Demonstration of
their cost/benefit potential
Environmental risk management appli-
cations (STREAM project). Enhanced
Camcopter UAV (enhanced product).
Coupling of airborne monitoring to GIS
(border patrol applications)
Bulk explosive detection MINESEYE Explosive detection system (airport se-
curity, prototype)
Data fusion GEODE, DREAM, LO-
TUS, DEMAND
Improved data fusion systems Improved data fusion systems for other
applications
Data taking MINETEST, MINESIGN,
MSMS
Signature DBs New test facili-
ties Surrogate mines
Fundamental Research
GIS DG DEV MINEDEMON,
ISIS, JRC activities
GIS for SE Europe Environmental risk management appli-
cations
GPR INFIELD, HOPE, DEM-
INE, DEMAND
Improved GPR (and GPR ar-
ray) design
Enhanced understanding of multi-
sensor probes. Enhanced understand-
ing of GPR physics. Improved GPR
(for civil engineering). Through-the-
wall UWB radar.
Metal detection (EMI) PICE, HOPE, MINES-
EYE
Improved MD (Schiebel AT-
MID, product)
Enhanced metal detectors in the
field. Enhanced understanding of EMI
physics (e.g., for NdT applications).
Inversion models (for imaging applica-
tions).
MD array LOTUS Fo¨rster MD array (product) Enhanced understanding of EMI
physics (e.g., for NdT applications).
Inversion models (for imaging applica-
tions).
MD+GPR INFIELD, HOPE Demonstrators Handheld multi-sensor systems cur-
rently field tested (MINEHOUND)
Other ICT TELEDIMOS Environmental risk management appli-
cations
Trace explosive detec-
tion
BIOSENS BIOSENS system Test cam-
paigns
Environmental risk management appli-
cations. Explosive and drug detection
system (BIOSENS, product). Coun-
terterrorism. Enhanced understanding
of explosive fate & transport.
– Humanitarian Demining activities started in
earnest during the late 80s-early 90s and soon made
the headlines thereafter. As one of the conse-
quences important RTD efforts were started, in-
cluding a strong EC R&D civilian program.
– Different countries replied in very different ways
(research fragmentation at the European and na-
tional level – fragmentation aspects are discussed
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in Ref. [5]).
– In a number of cases there has been little interac-
tion between decision makers, R&D organizations
and/or end users.
– As with many other “new” topics all involved ac-
tors had to climb their share of the learning curve,
new structures and ways of collaborating had to be
invented (e.g., International Test and Evaluation
Program, ITEP), with mixed success.
– Examples of coordinated end-to-end planning by
creating coherence between (1) policy, based on po-
litical decision, (2) RTD, testing and production of
equipment, and (3) timely deployment, supported
by a well organized and coordinated organizational
structure, showed effectiveness in bridging the gap
between R&D and Deployment.
– From the review of the EC R&D projects it ap-
peared that, at the current funding/project size,
the typical timeframe of 2-3 years is very short for
R&D projects, which include a requirements phase,
a specification phase, development and integration,
demonstrator building, laboratory testing and ini-
tial field tests by end users, to be effective. Cur-
rently the timeframe for R&D is not sufficiently
synchronized with the timeframe of the Humani-
tarian Action funding/operation.
– At the Humanitarian Demining sensing related
R&D level, the most notable developments which
have taken place during the past 10 years are: “(i)
an increased understanding of the problem, (ii) a
shift from a focus on the individual sensor as a so-
lution towards the individual sensor as part of a
set of tools, (iii) an increased emphasis on area re-
duction and the detection of minefield indicators
rather than individual mines, (iv) an increased em-
phasis on trace explosive detection, (v) the gaining
of importance of systematic test and evaluation (in
particular via the International Test and Evalua-
tion Program, ITEP) [11].”
– Although a host of physical principles have
been investigated to detect landmines, only
electromagnetic-based technologies, in particular
enhanced metal detectors and ground penetrating
radars, have seen significant advances and are be-
ing introduced into the field. Test results consis-
tently confirm that some of these technologies can
indeed increase the productivity of Humanitarian
Demining, while at least maintaining the current
high levels of safety. Several development groups
have shown this is the case for the combination of
a metal detector with ground penetrating radar.
– Well known demonstrator systems developed using
Earth Observation techniques (e.g., the DG Devel-
opment Pilot project: Airborne Minefield Detec-
tion in Mozambique, the DG IST ARC & SMART
projects) have been sufficiently demonstrated, to-
gether with their cost/benefit potential; however,
their take-up by end users has not been successful.
– Information Technology, including GIS, has been
demonstrated in several European projects (e.g.,
the DG IST ISIS “Intelligent Systems for Hu-
manitarian Geo-Infrastructure” project, and the
DG Development MINEDEMON “Mine Database
Demonstrator” project), as well as national
projects (RMA-Belgium Paradis). However, the
deployment of such systems for field use has
been achieved by the GICHD with its Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),
and by the Swedish EOD and Demining Centre
(SWEDEC) with its EOD IS system, using the end-
to-end planning approach mentioned above.
– At the R&D level the subject of Humanitar-
ian Demining started to lose importance as from
around 2004, being mostly taken over by security
related issues and environmental risk management
as a whole. The current reduction of the EU Hu-
manitarian Demining research program and its in-
corporation into the wider “Improving Risk Man-
agement” strategic objective, which was foreseen
as a way of generating synergies with other types
of responses to humanitarian crises management,
where technologies such as Information Manage-
ment, Geographical Information Management and
Earth Observation are more likely to be used in a
“System Approach”, did not generate the expected
synergies.
– Military R&D efforts are still ongoing, although re-
focused around specific topics, and likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future.
– On the civilian front some individual, mostly aca-
demic efforts are still ongoing at national level
(with a notable exception such as the IAEA TMs),
whereas large concerted projects are ending – like
for European projects – and might not be contin-
ued.
– Mine Action funding is mostly leveling off (also at
the EC level), but not decreasing and still substan-
tial (Ref. [13], pp. 64-72).
B. Main Conclusions
The study showed that the funding provided by the
European Commission has led directly to the creation
of an extensive portfolio of HD technology development
projects. However, the range of instruments available to
the EC to finance the necessary R&D was limited, un-
til the FP7 program, to pre-competitive research. The
EC had no tools or programs to fund actual product de-
velopment. The corresponding consequences have been
sketched above and are fully detailed in the study [4, 5].
The separation of the Mine Action and RTD funding
streams in the EC did also negatively affect the take-up
of new technologies (see also Ref. [14]).
Notwithstanding the previously illustrated limitations,
in some cases it has indeed been possible to bridge, at
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least partially, the gap to market. Four selected case
studies, of which only one was illustrated here, were ana-
lyzed in order to identify the enabling factors and the cir-
cumstances which actually made this happen [4]. Much
could be obtained from putting the corresponding lessons
learned in practice, in particular looking in-depth at the
case studies that came closer to the field and eventually
to the market.
As a main conclusion, creating coherence between: (1)
the EC policy based on political decisions, (2) RTD, test-
ing and industrialization of equipment, and (3) timely
deployment, requires a new way of coordinated think-
ing: “end-to-end planning” has to be supported by a
well organized and coordinated organizational structure
involving different DGs (Directorate General) and even
extending beyond the EU. This was not the case for Mine
Action.
C. Final remark
We would like to wrap up this paper with the final
paragraph from Ref. [11], which we believe still retains
all its validity: “The landmine problem is far from solved
and landmine detection and area reduction are still the
most important elements in the Humanitarian Demining
equation. Research and development of practical detec-
tion technologies and systems that are appropriate for
Humanitarian Demining, duly taking into account the
lessons learned and the developments outlined in this
section [Section 12 of Ref [11]], continues therefore to
represent one of the most significant contributions to the
solution of the landmine problem.”
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